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Frederik T. Schut and Managed Competition Reform
Herbert E.G.M. Hermans* in the Netherlands and
Its Lessons for Canada
This article provides an economic and legal perspective on the managed
competition reforms within the Netherlands. After an examination of the rationale
and the main features of the reforms, a number of problems and dilemmas that
were encountered during the implementation process will be highlighted. The
authors conclude that although the logic of the managed competition model is
appealing, its implementation is quite complicated and requires a strong govern-
ment with a continued commitment to set and enforce the rules of competition. If
these preconditions are not met, the prospects of a successful introduction of
managed competition are bleak. Despite its different health care system, Canada
may benefit from the Dutch reform experience, especially if the trend towards
decentralization of health planning and funding continues. In particular, the need
for an adequate definition of entitlement to health care will become more
pronounced.
Cet article traite, dans un contexte economique et juridique, de la concurrence
dirigee, une r6forme adopt6e et mise en place aux Pays-Bas. Les auteurs
effectuent une etude d6taill6e du raisonnement 6 I'origine de cette r6forme ainsi
que de ses principales caract6ristiques. De plus, ils soulignent les quelques
probl~mes et dilemmes encourus lors de son implantation. Ils concluent que
m~me si le modele de concurrence dirig~e paraft attrayant, son implantation
s'av~re assez compliqu6e et requiert la pr6sence d'un gouvernement fort,
poursuivant une politique bien 6tablie lui permettant de mettre en oeuvre toutes
les regles de la r6forme. En I'absence de ces conditions pr6alables, il sera difficile
de r~aliser une implantation r6ussie. Le systeme de sant6 canadien est quelque
peu different. Cependant, le Canada pourrait b6neficier de I'exp6rience
neerlandaise, surtout si la tendance vers la d6centralisation de I'organisation et
de la planification fiscale du systeme de sante se maintient. La recherche d' une
nouvelle definition 6tablissant le droit d'acc~s aux services de la sante sera alors
n6cessaire.
Introduction
In recent years, the health care policy debate in many countries has
concentrated on the issue of reform of health systems. The debate focuses,
* Frederik Schut is associate professor of health economics and Herbert Hermans is associate
professor of health law at the Department of Health Policy and Management (BMG) of
Erasmus University Rotterdam. We would like to thank Colleen Flood for helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.
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in particular, on the pros and cons of introducing some form of managed
competition to enhance the efficiency of health care delivery and to
contain costs. The prototype model of managed competition was devel-
oped by Enthoven as an alternative to the fragmented, inefficient and
inequitable U.S. health care system, in which unmanaged competition
had resulted in an expensive and uncontrollable medical arms race.'
By contrast, the starting point of managed competition reforms in
European countries, such as the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and
the U.K., is fundamentally different.2 To guarantee universal access,
these countries' health care systems are heavily regulated at the expense
of incentives for efficiency and innovation. Here, managed competition
is introduced to enhance efficiency and innovation while preserving
equity. Among these countries, the Netherlands was the first in which the
government proposed and actually started to implement comprehensive
managed competition reforms.
Although Canada borders the U.S.A., its health care system has more
in common with the European than with the U.S. health care system
(except for the distinction between a federal and state or provincial level
which is much less pronounced in European countries than on the other
side of the Atlantic). Indeed, the U.S. alternative is even regarded by
many Canadians as a disaster.3 Therefore, the European experience with
the introduction of managed competition in largely public health care
systems may be more relevant to Canada (and its provinces) than similar
attempts in the U.S., such as the Clinton Plan.
This paper investigates, from an economic and legal perspective, the
Dutch health care system's ten year experience with the introduction of
managed competition. First, the rationale of the managed competition
model will be explained. Then, the main features of the successive health
care reforms in the Netherlands will be highlighted as well as the
difficulties of implementing managed competition within the institu-
tional context of the Dutch health care system.
Next, the paper focuses on a number of central dilemmas which
emerged during the implementation process. The first dilemma is that the
1. A.C. Enthoven, "Consumer Choice Health Plan" (1978) 298 New Eng. J. Med. 650 & 709.
2. For example, see A.F. Casparie, H.E.G.M. Hermans & J.H.P. Paelinck, eds., Competitive
Health Care in Europe: Future Prospects (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1990); Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, The Reform of Health Care: A Comparative
Analysis of Seven OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1992); W.P.M.M. van de Ven, F.T. Schut
& F.F.H. Rutten, "Forming and Reforming the Market for Third-Party Purchasing of Health
Care" (1994) 39 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1405-1412.
3. R.G. Evans, "The Canadian Health-Care Financing and Delivery System: Its Experience
and Lessons for Other Nations" (1992) 10 Yale Law & Policy Review 362.
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reform goals of efficiency and cost containment may conflict with each
other because more value for money at the micro-level does not necessar-
ily imply less health care expenditure at the macro-level. The second
dilemma that had to be faced is that cost containment policies aimed at
restricting the scope of health services to which patients are legally
entitled may conflict with the objectives of the managed competition
reforms to encourage cost-effective substitution of care and to increase
consumer choice in order to tailor care more accurately to consumer
preferences. The third dilemma was how to combine an appropriate legal
definition of entitlement to health care with sufficient room for managed
care and alternative methods of health care delivery. We will analyze a
number of important court decisions putting limitations on the right to
health care and establishing the stance of the Dutch courts on the question
of whether efficiency or cost considerations can constitute a legitimate
ground to restrict the entitlement to (reimbursement of) health services.
Finally, we will discuss what lessons from the Netherlands' experi-
ence can be learned by Canadian policy-makers and regulators and
whether Canada should consider similar reforms.
I. Managed Competition and the Agency Role of Health Insurers
In many European countries governments have tried to reduce "moral
hazard"4 and to contain health care expenditures by supply-side regula-
tion. Indeed, governments did manage to gain substantial control over
total health care expenditure by unilaterally imposing restrictions on the
capacity and operating expenses of inpatient care institutions.' However,
the adverse consequences of such a top-down rationing strategy are
subject to growing criticism. Supply-side regulation would impede cost-
effective substitution of care and the utilization of economies of scale and
scope (thus reducing technical efficiency), would lack incentives to tailor
care to consumers' preferences (thus reducing allocative efficiency) and
would generate insufficient incentives for cost-reducing innovations in
the organization and delivery of health care (thus reducing dynamic
efficiency). These adverse effects would likely increase with the growing
complexity of medical care and with the increasing differentiation in the
demand for medical services.
4. Moral hazard is defined as the additional demand for health services, resulting from a
decrease in the net price of care attributable to health insurance.
5. B. Abel-Smith, "Cost Containment and New Priorities in the European Community"
(1992) 70 Milbank Q. 393.
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Health insurers - in countries with a health insurance system like
Germany, Belgium, France and the Netherlands -may be better equipped
for effectively managing care than the government. In countries with a
national health service, like the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Italy, third-
party payers could play a similar role, especially if the functions of
purchaser and provider are separated. This is because they usually have
to negotiate contracts with providers and have crucial information about
the amount and type of medical care which is provided to their subscri-
bers. The U.S. experience shows that insurers can manage care effec-
tively, particularly when it is integrated in financially accountable
multispecialty group practices, such as the classical Health Maintenance
Organizations .6
Whether health insurers will invest in managed care crucially depends
on the institutional context of the health care system. Depending on its
institutional setting, health insurers can perform the following functions
in a health care system':
- an insurance function: taking over the consumers' financial risk of
health care utilization by pooling homogeneous risks;
- an access function: guaranteeing universal access to basic health
services by enforcing cross-subsidies between different risk groups (and
income groups);
- an agency function: acting as a prudent buyer of care on behalf of the
consumers and reducing moral hazard by managing care.
Traditionally, public health insurers in Europe have performed the first
two functions, while private health insurers have largely restricted
themselves to the insurance function. In none of the European countries
with a social health insurance system are health insurers actively involved
in managed care. This is not surprising given that social health insurers
have neither the incentives nor the tools to employ managed care
activities.
Owing to the absence of financial liability for the medical expenses of
their enrollees and the lack of competition for subscribers, social health
insurers felt no need to manage care. Moreover, due to the prohibition of
selective contracting of providers and the extensive government regula-
tion of prices, facilities and entry, social insurers had only limited tools
to manage care.
Currently, many European countries are looking for ways to reform
their health care systems in order to provide social health insurers (or
6. See generally R.H. Miller & H.S. Luft, "Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A
Literature Analysis" (1994) 271 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1512.
7. Van de Ven et al., supra note 2 at 1406.
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health authorities in countries with a National Health System (NHS))
with incentives and tools to contain costs while maintaining quality and
universal access. The key problem that has to be addressed is the
reconciliation of apparently opposite requirements for universal access
and managed care. On the one hand, universal access requires a compul-
sory health insurance system with a comprehensive benefit package,
income-related contributions (or some other system of cross-subsidiza-
tion between income groups) and open enrollment. On the other, to
encourage health insurers to manage care effectively, they should be
made financially accountable and should be allowed to compete for
subscribers. However, competition among insurers can only be effective
when prices reflect real costs, meaning that insurers have to receive a
sufficiently risk-related payment for each subscriber. The requirements
of income-related contributions for securing solidarity and risk-related
contributions for supporting competition seem to conflict with each
other.
A solution to the problem of combining solidarity and competition in
health care can, at least in theory, be found in the model of "managed"
competition (also known as "regulated" or "administered" competition)
as developed and subsequently refined by Enthoven.8 Adapted versions
of this model underlie health care reforms in a number of countries, with
the Netherlands being a prominent example. 9 The main difference
between the U.S. and the European versions of managed competition is
that Europeans tend to entrust the responsibility of "competition engi-
neering" to the government, whereas the Americans, who are tradition-
ally more wary of government interference, prefer to leave this task to
independent agencies or purchasing cooperatives.
According to the managed competition model, the government (or
some independent agency) should provide insurers with the following
incentives to invest in managed care and to abstain from risk selection.
The government should institute an adequate system of risk-adjusted
compensation for health insurers. A system of risk-adjusted compensa-
tion is necessary to convert income-related contributions by subscribers
into risk-adjusted payments to health insurers. In addition to a risk-
adjusted payment mechanism, the government should prescribe an an-
nual open enrollment period and a standardized benefit package. It should
8. A.C. Enthoven, Theory and Practice of.Managed Competition in Health Care Finance
(Amsterdam: North- Holland, 1988).
9. F.T. Schut,Competition in the Dutch Health Care Sector (dissertation, Erasmus University,
1995).
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also create opportunities for price competition among insurers and
furnish them with sufficient tools to manage care. Specifically, individual
health insurers should be allowed to contract selectively with providers
and should be involved in health care facilities and manpower planning.
Moreover, an effective competition policy is required to counteract
anticompetitive conduct among insurers and providers. Finally, the
government should ensure that there is a systematic gathering and
evaluation of process and outcome data for quality assessment, and that
information regarding the quality of care is disseminated to the general
public.
II. Main Features of the Current Dutch Health Care System
For an appropriate understanding of Dutch health care reform a brief
description of the main features of the current health care system is
required. Like the Canadian system, the Dutch health care system is
characterized by a mixture of predominantly public insurance and inde-
pendent private providers.
Currently, about nine percent of the Dutch Gross Domestic Product is
spent on health care, which is about one percent less than in Canada. The
health care sector is predominantly financed by social and private health
insurance contributions (only about ten percent of total expenditures on
health and social services is derived from general taxation). Two social
health insurance schemes account for nearly two-thirds of total health
care expenditure.
The first scheme is constituted by the Exceptional Medical Expenses
Act (AWBZ), and was originally meant as a compulsory national insur-
ance for "extraordinary" medical expenses, such as long-term care and
uninsurable care (e.g. nursing home care, care for the physically and
mentally handicapped, inpatient psychiatric care). " Over time, however,
coverage has been gradually extended to less "extraordinary" medical
and social services, such as outpatient mental health care, home care,
medical devices and prescription drugs. The AWBZ is financed by
income-related contributions, copayments and government subsidies.
The second social health insurance scheme is constituted by the
Sickness Fund Act (ZFW) for more than 60 percent of the population
(non-government employees, pensioners and social security
beneficiariesand their familiesif they fall below a certain income level). "
10. Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (Exceptional Medical Expenses Act), Act of
December 14, 1967, Staatsblad (Official Journal of the State,) 617.
11. Ziekenfondswet (Sickness Fund Act), Act of October 15, 1964, Staatsblad (Official
Journal of the State) 392.
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This scheme covers most health services not covered by AWBZ. The
sickness fund scheme is financed by income-related contributions de-
ducted from employment payroll or social security benefits, which are
collected in a General Fund, administered by the Sickness Fund Council.
From this General Fund sickness funds are compensated for the medical
expenses of their subscribers. Sickness funds are legally obliged to have
an annual open enrollment period at the beginning of the year. By the end
of 1995 eligible subscribers had a choice of 27 sickness funds, most of
which have a strong regional basis. Hence, in contrast to the Canadian
"single payer" public insurance system, the Dutch sickness fund insur-
ance system is based on a "multi-payer" model.'
2
The remaining quarter of total health care expenditure is financed by
private health insurance and out-of-pocket payments. Approximately 40
percent of the population is privately insured against the cost of medical
treatment. The privately insured include higher-income employee groups,
the self-employed and government officials. In 1989, to preserve univer-
sal access to health care, all privately insured pensioners were brought
under a government-instituted risk pool arrangement by the Health
Insurance Access Act (WTZ). In 1991, other high-risk groups were
brought in as well.
There is a rather strict separation of the financing and delivery of health
care. The Sickness Fund Act forbids sickness funds to employ providers
or to run health care institutions. Private health insurers have traditionally
been anxious not to interfere with medical practice. They do not conclude
contracts with providers but simply reimburse the medical costs of their
insured.
A common feature of the Dutch and Canadian health care systems is
the sharp distinction between general practitioners (or primary care
providers) and medical specialists. In both health care systems the
general practitioner (GP) performs an important role as a gatekeeper of
the health care delivery system. The Sickness Fund Act requires that,
except in situations of emergency, sickness funds are only allowed to
compensate the cost of specialist medical care, paramedical services and
outpatient mental health care if patients are referred by a GP. Usually,
private health insurers also require a referral by a GP in their insurance
policies. Moreover, sickness fund insureds have to register with a GP in
their neighbourhood. Most GPs work as sole practitioners, although the
12. Although Canada is often characterized as a "single-payer" system, public expenditures
are around 70 percent of total health expenditures, which is much less than, for example, in the
U.K. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Reform of Health Care
Systems: A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994).
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number of group practices is steadily increasing. GPs receive a uniform
capitation payment for each patient insured with a sickness fund (with a
uniform mark-up for elderly patients and for patients living in disadvan-
taged neighbourhoods) and a fee-for-service payment for privately
insured patients. Maximum capitation payments (the amount of money a
GP receives per registered patient for a certain period of time) and fee
levels have to be negotiated between the officially recognized associa-
tions of health insurers and general practitioners and have to be approved
by the Central Board on Health Care Prices (COTG) on the basis of the
Health Care Prices Act (WTG).' 3
About 75 percent of the medical specialists are private entrepreneurs
who cooperate in hospital-based partnership-associations. Both sickness
funds and private health insurers reimburse specialists on a fee-for-
service basis. Since 1990, fee levels are derived from annual expenditure
targets, which are set by the government on the basis of the Health Care
Prices Act. 4 Currently, a heavily debated issue is the integration of
medical specialists into the hospital organization and the replacement of
the national fee-for-service payment schedule by alternative remunera-
tion systems, which are developed on a regional basis.
Most hospitals are state-independent institutions owned by private
non-profit foundations. The hospital sector is heavily regulated. Hospital
rates are derived from the hospital's capital costs and from an annual
global budget for operating expenses that hospitals have to negotiate with
health insurers. The legal basis for the determination of global hospital
budgets is provided by the Health Care Prices Act. Construction of new
hospitals and all other major hospital investments are subject to approval
by the government on the basis of the Hospital Facilities Act (WZV).'5
III. Health Care Reform and Managed Competition
Managed competition reforms in the Netherlands were instigated in 1987
by the proposals of the Dekker Commission which were endorsed by the
government.1 6 After a change of government in 1989 the plan was
13. Wet Tarieven Gezondheidszorg (Health Care Prices Act), Act of November 20, 1980,
Staatsblad (Official Journal of the State) 646.
14. H. Lieverdink & H. Maarse, "Negotiating Fees for Medical Specialists in The Nether-
lands" (1995) 31 Health Policy 81.
15. Wet Ziekenhuis Voorzieningen (Hospital Facilities Act), Act of March 25, 1971,
Staatsblad (Official Journal of the State) 268.
16. For an English summary, see Ministry of Welfare, Health And Cultural Affairs, Changing
Health Care in The Netherlands (Rijswijk: WVC, 1988).
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slightly modified and become known as the Simons Plan, named after the
former deputy minister of health. Subsequently, this plan was signifi-
cantly adjusted by the current government, which took office in 1994.
1. The Dekker and Simons Proposals
The Dekker proposals had two main components: a compulsory compre-
hensive national health insurance scheme and managed (or regulated)
competition among health insurers and among providers. The national
health insurance scheme was to guarantee universal access to "basic"
health care services, while managed competition was meant to create
incentives for both insurers and providers to improve the efficiency of
health care delivery.
The national basic insurance scheme would replace the segmented
health care financing system and would cover about 85 percent (accord-
ing to the Dekker Commission) or 95 percent (according to the Simons
Plan) of the total expenditure on health care and social services. The
national health insurance scheme had to be developed by a gradual
expansion of the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ). Gradually
all benefits covered by the sickness funds and private insurance would be
brought under the scope of the AWBZ. The legal distinction between
sickness funds and private health insurers would have to be abolished.
Both types of insurers would be allowed to offer coverage of "basic"
benefits as well as optional supplementary health insurance for services
not covered by national health insurance.
National health insurance would be financed primarily by income-
related contributions, collected through ear-marked taxation. The in-
come-related contributions would be pooled in a Central Fund, adminis-
tered by an independent statutory body, which would redistribute the
money to the various health insurers depending on the number of people
insured and the risk group to which they belong. Health insurers would
thus receive a predetermined risk-adjusted payment per subscriber (capi-
tation payment). Accordingly, the prevailing system of retrospective
reimbursement of sickness funds would be replaced by a prospective
budgeting system. The capitation payments to health insurers would have
to be risk-adjusted in order to neutralize insurers' incentives for risk
selection. In addition, the capitation payment would motivate insurers to
contain costs and to improve efficiency. Insurers would be able to make
a profit if the medical expenses of their subscribers were lower than the
average costs of other people belonging to the same risk group.
The capitation payments from the Central Fund would not be sufficient
to cover all medical expenses but would be set at a fixed amount of money
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below the average expected costs of the subscribers in each risk group.
Therefore, income-related contributions would have to be supplemented
by a community-rated premium, to be paid directly by the insured to the
health insurer. Health insurers would be free to determine this commu-
nity-rated premium. The more successfully the insurer contains medical
expenses, the lower the community-rated premium it can charge.
Health insurers would have to be furnished with instruments to foster
the efficiency of medical care. Insurers must first be given the freedom
to contract with selected providers and to differentiate the terms of the
contractual arrangements. Hence, the obligation for sickness funds to
contract with all relevant providers at nationally determined conditions
would have to be abolished. Secondly, both price regulation and hospital
capacity regulation would have to be reduced to expand the room for
insurers to manage care. Thirdly, the strict separation between purchasers
and providers would have to be removed to provide for the development
of alternative delivery systems like Health Maintenance Organizations.
Health insurers would have to compete for subscribers and providers
for contracts with health insurers. Health insurers would have to compete
both on price - the flat-rate premium - and on quality of the contracted
health services. Once every two years consumers would be given the
opportunity to switch from one health insurer to another. Health insurers
would be obliged to accept any applicant, irrespective of health status, on
the same terms. Selective contracting by health insurers would have to
motivate providers also to compete on the price and the quality of their
services.
2. Implementation and Evaluation of the Dekker-Simons Plan
In the eyes of the public, the Dekker and Simons reforms have been a
failure. This is no surprise, since the two key elements of the reform -
comprehensive basic health insurance and managed competition - were
not achieved.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of overall success, some major steps
towards the accomplishment of the proposed managed competition
model were taken. Major revisions of the Sickness Fund Act made it
possible for sickness funds to contract selectively with health care
professionals and to compete for subscribers. By a revision of the Health
Care Prices Act in 1992, sickness funds and private health insurers were
permitted to negotiate lower fees than those officially approved. Finally,
since 1993, sickness funds are no longer fully and retrospectively
reimbursed for their subscribers' medical expenses, but receive a pro-
spective, risk-adjusted per capita payment for each subscriber from the
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General Fund. However, since capitation payments were only adjusted
for the age and sex of the subscribers, the allocation of funds was too
crude to make sickness funds fully liable for the medical expenses of their
subscribers. Therefore, the government decided that until the risk-
adjustment method was improved, sickness funds would be compensated
for 97 percent of incurred losses, while 97 percent of surpluses had to be
refunded. As a consequence, the actual financial risk (and incentives) for
sickness funds still remained very small.
The effects of these policy measures were evaluated by the Sickness
Fund Council.1 7 The evaluation points out that sickness funds neither
used the option of selective contracting nor negotiated lower than
officially approved fees. The main effect of health care reform so far has
been a large number of mergers among health insurers and among
hospitals and a considerable reinforcement of regional cooperation
among health care providers. According to the council report, the main
causes of the lack of effective competition were the absence of substantial
financial incentives for insurers, collusion by both providers and insurers,
and successive reductions of providers' fees by the government.
3. The 1995 Health Care Reform Plan
In March 1995, the new Minister of Health published a considerably
adjusted health reform plan. 8 The goal of a comprehensive basic health
insurance for all citizens was abandoned. Instead, the new government
aimed at reforming the incentive structure of the financing system,
leaving the segmented framework largely intact.
The proposed financing system consists of three main compartments,
covering different types of health services and each with a different
regulatory regime (see Table 1).
17. Ziekenfondsraad (Sickness Fund Council), Evaluatie Overeenkomstenstelsel
Ziekenfondswet en Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (Evaluation of the Contracting
System of the Sickness Fund Act and the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act), Report 673
(Amstelveen: ZFR, 1995).
18. Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, Kostenbeheersing in de Zorgsector (Cost
Containment in the Care Sector), Second Chamber, Parliamentary Year 1994-1995, 21124
(1-2).
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Table 1: Health Care Financing System According to the 1995 Health Reform Plan
Compartment Financing Payer Regulatory regime
I Long-term care National health Regional single Government regulation
and mental health insurance payers of supply and prices
care (AWBZ)
2 Curative "basic" Mandatory health Sickness funds Managed competition
care insurance and private (Dekker model)
health insurers
3 "Amenities" and Voluntary health Sickness funds Free market
inexpensive care insurance and private
health insurers
a. First Compartment
The AWBZ will be restricted to cover only long-term care and mental
health care. All other benefits covered by the AWBZ should be trans-
ferred to the second or third compartment. In 1996, prescription drugs,
medical devices and rehabilitation were transferred from the AWBZ to
the second compartment, followed by hospital-related home health
services in 1997. Currently the AWBZ is administered by all sickness
funds and private health insurers but starting in 1998 the administration
will be entrusted to a regional single payer - probably the largest regional
sickness fund - in each of the legally defined 27 health regions. Hence, in
the first compartment there is no room for competition among insurers.
This deviation from the original Dekker Plan is likely to be an improve-
ment because, for a substantial part of the services covered by AWBZ,
even properly managed competition might not work. For a range of long-
term care and mental health care services effective pressure from the
demand side is lacking, either because most people who need such care
may not have the mental ability to make a trade-off between price and
quality of health insurance plans, or because people have such a low
chance of needing such care during the next contract period that they do
not bother about the quality of the providers selected by the insurer.' 9
To keep public expenditure under control, the government intends to
regulate both prices and supply of services covered by the AWBZ. In each
sector prices are derived from an annual budget determined by the
government. Hence, in the first compartment the government sticks to its
19. The inability of mental health patients to make trade-offs between price and quality of
various health plans may be less of a problem if they are effectively represented by their
families, patient organizations or other advocates. See W.P.M.M. van de Ven & F.T. Schut,
"Should Catastrophic Risks Be Included in a Regulated Competitive Health Insurance
Market?" (1994) 39 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1459.
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traditional policy of supply-side regulation and consequently there is
little room left for competition among providers. However, two impor-
tant exceptions should be noted.
First, since 1995 limited funds were created for providing individual
patients with optional budgets for home care and care for the mentally
handicapped. Patients with an appropriate indication may opt for such a
"personal budget" to purchase care by themselves instead of using the
legally defined service benefits. 0 For instance, instead of using home
help by a regular home care organization, people may spend their budget
on care provided by neighbours, friends or relatives. Hence, the regular
home health organizations have to compete for a share of these personal
budgets. Indeed, the first experience with the allocation of personal
budgets was that only 12 percent of the volume of services was purchased
from the regular home care organizations.2' Since the total funds avail-
able for granting these personal budgets are less than three percent of the
total budget for home care, their impact on the provision of home health
services is limited. Moreover, due to the limited funds, not everyone who
applies for a personal budget actually gets one since budgets are allocated
on a first come - first serve basis.
Second, for five percent of the budget for home care the government
introduced the possibility of competition. Regional single payers are
obliged to allocate 95% of the available budget to the traditional regional
home care organization but may allocate the residual budget to other
officially recognized home care agencies. Initially, the government
announced that it would gradually raise the uncommitted share of the
budget from five to 35 percent, which would substantially increase
competition among home care agencies. But the lack of adequate rules for
the competitive bidding process, and the unconditioned entry of new
commercial home care organizations, resulted in such chaos that in May
1997 the government decided to suspend further introduction of compe-
tition in this sector until the year 2001 by blocking the entry of new
competitors and by freezing the share of the budget for competitive
bidding. Notwithstanding the haphazard way competition was intro-
20. For each eligible person a budget is determined on the basis of a needs assessment. Such
a needs assessment is currently performed by the regional home health care organizations but,
starting in 1998, this task will be entrusted to independent municipal organizations. The first
2,400 guilders of the annual budget is paid in cash and can be freely spent on home care services
and other things, and the remainder of the budget, if any, is made available as a drawing right,
administered by a government-instituted budget-holding organization.
21. T.Miltenburg,T.&C.L.Ramakers,eds.,EvaluatieSubsidieregelingPersoonsgebonden
Budget Verpleging en Verzorging 1995 (Evaluation of the 1995 Subsidy Arrangement for
Personal Home Care Budgets) (Nijmegen: ITS, 1996).
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duced, the entry of new competitors forced the traditional monopolistic
home care organizations to raise their productivity.22
b. Second Compartment
All citizens should have access to the "basic" benefits that are included
in the second compartment. In this compartment the government is
proceeding with the implementation of the Dekker model of managed
competition. To motivate insurers to purchase cost-effective care on
behalf of their customers the government has planned a drastic increase
in the financial risk for health insurers. Within three years, sickness funds
are to be fully prospectively paid for all medical care covered in the
second compartment, except for hospital capital costs. This would imply
that the financial risk for sickness funds would increase from three
percent to about 65 percent of their total expenditure on "basic" curative
services. In 1996 and 1997 the prospective payment system was im-
proved by adding new risk-adjusters (region of residence and disability
status) to the formula and by an excess-of-loss provision. At the same
time, the share of prospective payment in total reimbursement has been
raised from three percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 1996 and further to 27
percent in 1997 (see Table 2).
Table 2: The Changing Blend of Payments to Sickness Funds: 1992-1997
1992 1993-1995 1996 1997
Retrospective reimbursement 100% 97% 86% 73%
Prospective risk-adjusted 0% 3% 14% 27%
capitation payments
Whether the ambitious scheme to increase the financial liability of
sickness funds can be realized depends crucially on a further improve-
ment of the risk-adjustment methodology. It is unlikely, however, that in
1997 the risk-adjustment method can be sufficiently improved to make
sickness funds fully accountable for the medical expenses of their
subscribers. Nevertheless, even a less substantial increase in the financial
risk and incentives for sickness funds is likely to cause an important
22. For example, in 1995 the total number of hours of home care provided by these
organizations increased by 1.5 percent with a concurrent reduction in employed personnel.
Landelijke Vereniging van Thuiszorg (National Association for Home Care), Jaarboek
Thuiszorg 1995 (Annual Report on Home Health Care 1995), (Utrecht: NZi/LVT, 1997).
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change of behaviour in purchasing health care and in contracting with
providers.
As of 1997 the increasing financial accountability has provoked
significant price competition among sickness funds, the cheapest sick-
ness fund charging a 40 percent lower flat-rate premium than the most
expensive one, whereas in 1996 this margin was only ten percent. In
addition, an increasing number of sickness funds are considering, or have
already started, managed care activities, such as case management for
large claims, coordination of referrals by general practitioners to medical
specialists and vice versa, provision of information on resource use to
physicians and development of preferred provider organizations.
In addition to the gradual expansion of the financial accountability of
sickness funds, in 1997 the Sickness Fund Act was modified to introduce
a system of limited user charges for sickness fund enrollees to also give
them an incentive to use health services more prudently.23 As in Canada,
the introduction of cost sharing for physician and hospital charges is a
very controversial issue and has been disputed for several decades,
notwithstanding the fact that for long-term care and in the private health
insurance market user charges are quite common. The heated debate on
this issue resulted in a political compromise involving a very complicated
user-charge scheme. The scheme consists of a combination of a fixed
copayment per hospital-day and a 20 percent coinsurance rate for all other
benefits (except visits to a GP) subject to a specified annual maximum of
200 guilders (100 guilders for the elderly) and supplemented by provi-
sions to compensate the chronically ill. Owing to the complex design of
this system of user charges, preliminary estimates show that its potential
benefits in terms of a reduction of moral hazard may well be outweighed
by its considerable administration costs.
In the long run, the government aims at a complete convergence of
sickness funds and private health insurers, although it has not stipulated
how this should be accomplished. In the short run, convergence is limited
to synchronizing the benefit packages of sickness funds and private
health insurers and equalizing the maximum level of provider fees both
types of insurers have to pay. In addition, to combine financial incentives
for efficiency with universal access in the private health industry, the
government intends to regulate competition among private health insur-
23. Besluit van 24 Oktober 1996 tot Wijziging van het Verstrekkingenbesluit
ziekenfondsverzekering en het Vergoedingenbesluit Particulier Verzekerden in Verband met
Invoering van een Algemeen Systeem van Eigen Bijdragen (Directive of October 24, 1996 on
Modification of the Directive on Sickness Fund Insurance Provisions and of the Regulation on
Benefits for Privately Insured in Connection with the Introduction of a General System of User
Charges), Staatsblad (Official Journal of the State) 541.
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ers by introducing a combination of rate banding (by the specification of
minimum and maximum premiums), open enrollment and the implemen-
tation of some sort of risk equalization scheme (a system of financial
transfers to compensate insurers with a relatively large number of high-
risk subscribers whose anticipated costs are higher than the maximum
premium). So far, however, the government has failed to accomplish any
of its plans to reform the private health insurance industry.
For services included in the second compartment the government
intends to deregulate both price setting and capacity planning. In due
course health insurers and health care providers have to be fully respon-
sible for negotiating prices and the planning of health care facilities,
except for large hospital investments. The prevailing hospital budgeting
system would have to make way for a system of output-pricing and for
several years a large research project has been proceeding on developing
an appropriate classification of hospital output.
c. Third Compartment
According to the 1995 health reform plan "amenity care" and services
which are easily affordable to all citizens should be transferred to the
supplementary health insurance of the third compartment. In due course
the government intends to withdraw any specific regulation of the
provision or financing of these services on the rationale that collective
responsibility for these services is not necessary.
Following the recommendations of the Government Committee on
Choices in Health Care (also known as the "Dunning Commission") the
government intends to transfer any benefit to the third compartment
which cannot satisfy criteria of medical necessity, effectiveness, effi-
ciency and non-affordability.24 Applying these criteria, the government
has already shifted dental care for adults and parts of physiotherapy
services to the third compartment. According to the government, the costs
of dental care are low enough to be left to individual responsibility (the
fourth criterion), while the effectiveness of some treatments by physio-
therapists are not proven (the second criterion). Critics of these transfers
to supplementary insurance contend that the government's main purpose
was to reduce the share of public expenditure on total health care finance
rather than to implement a careful application of the criteria of the
Dunning Commission.
24. Government Committee on Choices in Health Care, Choices in Health Care (Rijswijk:
Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1992).
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In practice, the application of the criteria of the Dunning Commission
turns out to be anything but straightforward. For instance, after the
exclusion of dental care from social insurance coverage, it soon became
clear that high-risk individuals had difficulty obtaining affordable supple-
mentary insurance coverage for dental prostheses. Hence, after several
months of heavy political pressure the government decided to transfer
dental prostheses back to social insurance coverage.
IV. Health Care Reform and Corporatist Decision-making
An important lesson of the Dutch health care reform so far has been the
difficulty of implementing radical reforms in a society with a rather weak
state and powerful interest groups.2 ' Throughout this century, Dutch
governments have consisted of coalition cabinets of varying composi-
tion. Since no political party has ever had an absolute majority, compro-
mises always had to be made. Furthermore, officially recognized associa-
tions of providers and health insurers are entrusted with substantial
authority (on the basis of provisions in the Sickness Fund Act, the
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act and the Health Care Prices Act)26 to
negotiate health care prices and other contractual conditions. In addition,
these associations can influence health policy through a number of
advisory bodies in which they are formally represented.
Within this neo-corporatist decision-making structure, neither gov-
ernment nor any of the major interest groups has enough power to
accomplish fundamental changes independent from the others. However,
each of them has sufficient influence to obstruct the others' initiatives.
Unilateral government intervention can only succeed if self-regulation
clearly fails.
Although the slow and cumbersome decision-making process is vex-
ing, it also has the important advantage that it may prevent the implemen-
tation of insufficiently understood or examined changes. For instance,
had health care reforms in the Netherlands been implemented according
to the original time schedule, which envisaged full implementation in
1992, serious problems would have arisen. Critical preconditions for
success-such as an adequate risk-adjusted payment system for health
25. T.E.D. van der Grinten, "Scope for Policy: Essence, Operation and Reform of Policy of
Dutch Health Care" in L.J. Gunning-Schepers, GJ. Kronjee & R.A. Spasoff, Fundamental
Questions about the Future of Health Care (SDU: The Hague, 1996); F.T. Schut, "Health Care
Reform in The Netherlands: Balancing Corporatism, Etatism and Market Mechanisms" (1995)
20 J. Health Pol., Policy & Law 615.
26. Supra notes 10, 11, 13.
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insurers and an adequate system of output-pricing-were simply not in
place.
The corporatist organization of the Dutch health care system explains
why health care reform is proceeding so slowly. Recognizing this, the
current government has adopted a less ambitious stance toward health
care reform, concentrating on the implementation of a limited number of
policy measures during its term.
For several reasons, however, the role of organized interest groups in
health policy is declining. First, the new government has initiated a
fundamental reorganization of the decision-making structure in order to
disentangle advisory, administrative and superintendent functions. Sec-
ond, in 1992 a revision of the Health Care Prices Act, which was meant
to deregulate price setting in health care, actually gave the government
substantially more power to control providers' fees because a new
provision in the law empowered the government to impose fee reductions
in order to meet specified expenditure targets .27 Since then, the govern-
ment has not only used this newly acquired power for meeting its cost
containment objectives, but also for urging providers, and in particular
medical specialists, to cooperate with fundamental changes in the remu-
neration system which is an ingredient of the proposed health care reform.
As a consequence, in 1997 the government felt strong enough to propose
a highly controversial amendment of the Sickness Fund Act to integrate
medical specialists with the hospital organization by abolishing their
right to charge patients and sickness funds independently for their
services .28
V. Managed Competition and Cost Containment
Despite its intentions and policy measures to implement managed com-
petition for basic curative services, the government still relies heavily on
supply-side regulation. With managed competition still far from being
27. Wet Beperking Contracteerplicht Ziekenfondsverzekering en Invoering van een
Maximumtarief (Act on Limiting Contractual Obligation Sickness Fund Insurance and
Introduction Maximum Prices),Act of November 20, 1991, Staatsblad (Official Journal of the
State) 584.
28. Wijziging van de Ziekenfondswet en de Wet op de Toegang tot Ziektekostenverzekeringen
in Verband met de Invoering van een Aanpraak op Medisch Specialistische Zorg, Verleend
door of vanwege een Ziekenhuis dan wel door een Samenwerkingsverband van een Ziekenhuis
en de daar Werkzame Medisch Specialisten (Modification of the Sickness Fund Act and the
Health Insurance Access Act in Connection with the Introduction of an Entitlement to Medical
Specialist Care, Provided by a Hospital or by a Co-operation of a Hospital and its Hospital-
based Medical Specialists), Second Chamber, Parliamentary Year 1996-1997, 25258.
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realized, it offers no short-term perspective on cost containment while the
government is under permanent political pressure to control the growth
of health care expenditures. Moreover, the government is reluctant to
abandon supply-side regulation because it is wary about the willingness
and capabilities of insurers to manage care effectively. Finally, the
government faces the dilemma that while managed competition may
improve efficiency and reduce unit costs, it may not guarantee the
realization of macro-economic cost containment goals. This is because
managed competition may not only lead to lower production costs but
also to higher productivity and a higher responsiveness to consumer
preferences or patient needs. The drawback of the persisting government
reliance on supply-side regulation is that it discourages insurers and
providers from investing in managed care.
VI. Putting Limitations on the Entitlement to Health Care
Next to supply-side regulation and managed competition, the govern-
ment can employ a third strategy to contain public expenditure on health
care. This third strategy consists of putting limitations on the right to
health care either by transferring specific services from the second to the
third compartment (supplementary insurance) or by narrowing the con-
ditions for providing services covered by social insurance. Restricting the
entitlement to health care benefits is a complex and controversial matter,
particularly when equated, probably erroneously, with rationing .29 There
is much room for disagreement on when and to what extent such
restrictions really are necessary, especially in health systems character-
ized by high levels of technical inefficiency and of medical practice
variation.
Moreover an important dilemma here is that restricting the scope of
health services to which patients are legally entitled may conflict with the
objectives of the managed competition reforms to encourage cost-
effective substitution of care and to increase consumer choice in order to
tailor care more accurately to consumer preferences. Indeed, an impor-
tant recommendation by the Dekker Commission was to relax the rigid
definitions of service benefits covered by the Sickness Fund Act by
eliminating the legal specification of the health professional who will
provide the service and the institution where the delivery will take place.
As a first step to put this recommendation into practice, in 1996 the
29. W.P.M.M. van de Ven, "Choices in Health Care: A Contribution from The Netherlands"
(1995) 51 B. Med. Bull. 781.
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sickness funds were provided with limited opportunities to substitute not-
covered for covered services.30
1. The Distinction between Basic and Non-basic Health Services
The government intends to make a distinction between "basic" services
that should be brought under the scope of managed competition and other
services that should be rendered to the free market, by applying the four
criteria developed by the Dunning Commission: medical necessity,
effectiveness, efficiency and non-affordability. A careful application of
the Dunning criteria is crucial since any expansion of the scope of the
unregulated supplemental insurance market with necessary and expen-
sive health services will reduce equity and may jeopardize universal
access. However, as argued earlier, the experiences with the practical
application of the criteria of the Dunning Commission are not very
reassuring. For many medical procedures the clinical evidence required
to operationalize the criteria of necessity and effectiveness is currently
too thin. Furthermore, cost-effectiveness studies are often not available
for applying the efficiency criterion. Finally, the experience with dental
health care demonstrates that even the relatively straightforward criterion
of whether a service is individually affordable is not easy to apply in
practice.
2. Individual and Social Rights to Health Care
The second way to limit the entitlement to health care is to narrow the
conditions for providing services covered by social insurance. However,
the extent to which this strategy can be pursued depends critically on the
legal protection of the citizen's rights to health care.
Current legal doctrine distinguishes between individual and social
rights in the sphere of health. Individual rights aim at protecting the
individual sphere regarding information, consent, confidentiality and
privacy. Those concerning care and treatment are social rights.3" These
two categories of rights complement each other and are interdependent.
Social rights must therefore aim at safeguarding individual rights and
individual rights ought to be considered in relation to the individual's
30. Sickness Fund Council, Tijdelijke Subsidieregeling Vervangende Hulp
Ziekenfondsverzekering (Temporary Subsidy Arrangementfor Substitute Care Sickness Fund
Insurance) (Amstelveen: Ziekenfondsraad, 1996).
31. H.JJ. Leenen et al., eds., The Rights of Patients in Europe: A Comparative Study
(Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993) at 1.
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participation in society.32 Individual rights are the concern of civil and
penal law. The group of social rights typically is a part of administrative
law.33
In the Netherlands, the social right to health care is based upon article
22 of the Dutch Constitution, which states that "the authorities shall take
steps to promote the health of the population." The legal implications of
this article are very limited. When this basic social right was introduced
in the Dutch Constitution in 1983, the original official interpretation was
that it was nothing more than a symbolic right, taking the form of a "mere"
obligation for public authorities to be concerned with setting up health
care facilities and facilitating access to health care. The article does not
imply, however, that the government should be directly involved in the
provision of health services. Therefore, it gives the courts little, if any,
scope to recognize claims based on social rights.
The Dutch civil courts' competence forjudging the right to health care
is based on the general provision contained in article 112, subsection 1,
of the Constitution which states that "the judgement of disputes on civil
rights and obligations shall be the responsibility of the judiciary." In
addition, article 112 subsection 2 of the Constitution provides for admin-
istrative courts which give citizens legal protection with regard to specific
questions. The statutory basis for administrative courts dealing with
health issues is contained in the sickness fund and AWBZ legislation.
Finally, article 115 of the Constitution envisages administrative appeal
bodies. Dutch citizens have the means to challenge decisions or actions
of the public administration which they consider to infringe on their rights
or legitimate interests before turning to a civil or administrative court. On
the basis of article 5 of the Constitution, citizens have the right to petition
a public authority (in this case a health authority) asking it to revoke or
compensate for decisions which have caused them to suffer harm.
Citizens can also make representations during the decision-making
process. In addition, public authorities are statutorily required to activate
certain consultative procedures. Finally, Dutch citizens have to submit
written objections (before going to court) requesting an administrative
body (in this case a sickness fund) to reconsider a particular decision.
32. HJJ. Leenen, G. Pinet & A.V. Prims, Trends in Health Legislation in Europe (Paris:
Masson/World Health Organization, 1988).
33. A.V. Prims, "Care and Treatment" in HJJ. Leenen et al., eds., Promotion of the Rights
of Patients in Europe: Proceedings of a WHO Consultation (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1995) at 68.
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3. Entitlement Based on National Legislation and International
Treaties
For many years before the introduction of article 22 in the Dutch
Constitution, national legislation on health insurance3 4 and international
treaties on basic social rights, such as the European Social Charter,"
provided for rights to health care for those with (public) health insurance.
Compared to the constitutional right, these rights have much more
content, since social and health legislation have translated the right to
health care into a right to equal access and freedom of choice.
As a result of the separation between "insurers" (sickness funds) and
providers, the Dutch health care system has always had some form of
entitlement-setting mechanism. By law, patients are entitled to health
care services and benefits as defined in the acts and directives based on
those acts. Until the beginning of the 1980s when cost containment in
health care became a major political goal, patients in principle had access
to virtually all care that was medically and technically possible. Since
then, entitlement to care has come increasingly under tight central control
and new benefits now have to pass a complex procedure. The Sickness
Fund Council (Ziekenfondsraad) advises the Ministry of Health whether
new benefits should be granted or whether to withhold entitlement status.
The Ministry makes the final decisions in these matters, with health
insurers having little say. These decisions are formalized in entitlement
directives and regulations,3 6 which describe the health services gua-
ranteed and the kind of providers authorized to deliver the services in
question. Directives can be very general, as in the case of specialist and
nursing home care, or quite detailed, as with outpatient care, prescription
drugs and medical appliances.
In principle, sickness funds are not allowed to pay for services not
covered by a directive. However, to stimulate managed care, in 1996
sickness funds were offered the opportunity by a "flexicare arrangement"
to pay for services not covered,37 provided that these services were cost-
effective substitutes for covered services and the payments did not exceed
three percent of the medical expenses of a sickness fund.
34. Supra notes 10, 11.
35. European Social Charter, Torino, October 18, 1961, Trb. 1961,90.
36. Verstrekkingenbestuit Ziekenfondsverzekering (Directive on Sickness Fund Insurance
Provisions), Directive of January 4, 1996, Staatsblad (Official Journal of the State) 3; Besluit
Zorgaanspraken Bijzondere Ziektekostenverzekering (Directive on Entitlement to Excep-
tional Health Insurance Provisions), Directive of November 20, 1991, Staatsblad (Official
Journal of the State) 590; Uitvoeringsbesluit Vergoedingen Particulier Verzekerden (Execu-
tive Regulation Privately Insured) Regulation of March 27, 1986, Staatscourant (Journalofthe
State) 61.
37. Sickness Fund Council, supra note 30.
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VII. Court Decisions on Restrictions on Entitlement to Health Care
Given that the right to health care in the Netherlands has substantial legal
content, it is inevitable that conflicts resulting from attempts to restrict
entitlement end up in the legal arena. With increasing frequency Dutch
courts have had to make judgements on the right to health care with
explicit reference to questions of the cost of care. Among the numerous
court cases in the Netherlands provoked by attempts by health authorities
to restrict entitlements, we have selected a number of important cases.
The introduction of selective contracting and managed care by health
insurers will limit the patient's choice of provider, which is likely to
become increasingly challenged by both patients and providers. Al-
though selective contracting and managed care are just beginning to
proliferate, we will discuss a number of preliminary cases involving
sickness funds' contracting practices.
1. Cases Involving Restrictions on Social Health Insurance Coverage
The Regional Court of The Hague had to judge on the case of a woman
appealing against refusal of a hospital to provide in vitro fertilization
treatment.38 This service was not covered by social health insurance. The
woman claimed that the hospital had failed to provide the treatment which
it had led her to believe would be given. The Court declared that "a
hospital is free to decide whether a couple can or cannot have treatment
[...] However, the freedom of a hospital is restricted in the sense that it is
not permitted to discriminate between patients or withhold a treatment for
which it has raised the expectations of patients." In this case the Court
considered that the hospital had not raised expectations and the appeal
was rejected.
A case in 1989 involved the explicit choices made by a regional
hospital. The hospital had decided to suspend PTCA treatments (Percu-
taneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty) for the remainder of the
year, having already used up the budget allocated for this treatment for
that year. A patient who had been placed on the waiting list applied to his
sickness fund for funding, to be paid either to him or to the hospital, to
finance immediate treatment. The Regional Court of 's Hertogenbosch,
declared that the sickness fund was liable because it had refused to meet
its obligations under article 8 of the Sickness Fund Act.39 The sickness
38. Regional Court of The Hague, Sentence 17 July 1990,Tijdschrift voorGezondheidsrecht,
no. 90/88.
39. Regional Court of 's Hertogenbosch, Civil Chamber, Sentence 24 November 1989,
Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht, no. 90/19.
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fund appealed. According to the Court of Appeal, the sickness fund had
the obligation to control whether the hospital was fulfilling its duty to
provide adequate care to patients.' It was not required, however, to
provide the necessary funds to the hospital since this might be seen as
nullifying the legally approved hospital budget. The sickness fund
instead could take legal action to compel the hospital to provide the
necessary treatment to the patient.
A fundamental decision for the rights of Dutch patients to foreign
health care was reached by the Central Appeals Board regarding the
refusal of a sickness fund to reimburse a patient for a by-pass operation
inLondon.4' The Central Appeals Board, referring to article 9, subsection
4 of the Sickness Fund Act, held that urgent treatment cannot be refused
merely because it is provided abroad. What is relevant instead is whether
the medical care is necessary for the patient and could have been provided
domestically. In the case in question, the patient could have obtained a
similar treatment in the Netherlands. The Board decided that in this case
there was no medical necessity for an operation in London; the sickness
fund was willing to pay for the operation in Amsterdam and the patient
could be treated within the time period requested. The Board held that the
sickness fund was not obliged under article 22, EC Regulation 1408/71
to give its consent for the treatment. A patient could claim to have a right
under this article only if the necessary treatment could not be provided
within a clinically acceptable period of time within the country of
residence.
In another case in which a sickness fund refused to pay for a by-pass
operation in London, the Court of Appeal in The Hague decided that the
fund could legitimately decide to refuse to cover treatment when this is
available within a reasonable time period in the patient's country of
residence. 42 A waiting time of three months is not to be considered
apriori as a legally binding maximum applicable to all patients needing
the treatment in question. In the case in question, the patient had failed to
prove that for his particular clinical condition the maximum possible
waiting time was three months or less and that within that time period no
treatment could have been obtained in the Netherlands. The Court held
that patients should be considered on a case by case basis in order to
ascertain the acceptable maximum waiting time.
40. Court of Appeal, Sentence RZA, no. 90/127.
41. Central Appeals Board, Sentence November 3 1989, RZA, no. 90/6.
42. Court of Appeal The Hague, Sentence 7 March 1991, RZA, no. 91/122.
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2. Cases Involving Insurers' Contracting Practices
Whereas the introduction of selective contracting increased the freedom
of health insurers to select professionals, it reduced the freedom of the
insured to choose a provider of their choice. Therefore, selective contract-
ing is likely to put a strain on the sickness funds' relations with both
subscribers and health care professionals.
An anticipated result from the new contracting system in the sickness
fund sector is that more patients will go to court to assert their rights to
benefits which the health insurers have not contracted for at all or for
which the contracted amount is insufficient. The Regional Court of The
Hague considered the case of a patient who had requested the Academic
Hospital in Leiden to perform a heart defibrillator implant on an urgent
basis.43 The hospital had refused to perform the operation on the grounds
that no contract existed obliging it to provide such a service. The Court
declared that, even if the hospital were considered to have a contractual
obligation vis-a-vis the patient for this operation, it nevertheless had the
right to delay honouring the contractual obligation if it had reason to
believe that the costs of the operation would not be reimbursed by the
health insurer. The implant was not classified as a sickness fund benefit
and, in addition, the Academic Hospital did not have a contract with the
patient's health insurer. The patient's claim was denied.
Another case was brought by a group of orthopaedic patients. They
requested that a sickness fund provide the necessary funding for ortho-
paedic operations in a particular hospital using an artificial implant, with
the choice of the implant model being left to the surgeon. It was argued
that the sickness fund had a legal obligation to provide funding, and that
therefore this service was a legitimate benefit. According to the Regional
Court of Haarlem, the patients in question had a claim on the hospital
insofar as the benefit in question had been contracted for by the insurer
on their behalf, but they were not entitled to more care from the hospital
than the insurer had contracted for." The rights of the patients did not
extend to having immediate delivery of the care in question financed by
the health insurer or to the surgeon being free to use any implant available
on the market. In this case, the surgeon intended to use an implant that was
between two to four times more expensive than other implants available
but considered to be equally suitable. According to the Court, the
43. Regional Court of The Hague, Sentence 27 January 1993, Tijdschrift voor
Gezondheidsrecht, no. 94/24.
44. Regional Court of Haarlem, Sentence 17 September 1993, Tijdschrift voor
Gezondheidsrecht, no. 94/25.
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implants the surgeon used could not be considered to be medically
indicated benefits under article 8 of the Sickness Fund Act. The Court
observed that the hospital had already allocated a budget to the ortho-
paedic unit which was above the national average. The Court proposed
that the claimants be offered the operation at another location using a
cheaper implant, but this offer was turned down.
Selective contracting by health insurers stirs not only patients to
undertake legal action against a denial of services or claims reimburse-
ment, but also moves providers to challenge a termination or modifica-
tion of contracts. During the first four years after the abolition of the "any
willing provider provision" in the Sickness Fund Act in 19924" selective
contracting led to more than 25 legal cases which were put before the civil
courts. In most of these cases the health care professionals opposed a
refusal by a sickness fund to renew the previously existing contractual
relationship.
In a pivotal case, the Regional Court of Almelo rejected a claim of a
regional association of physiotherapists and a number of individual
physiotherapists that the largest sickness fund in their region should be
forced to (re)negotiate contracts with a number of physiotherapists .46 The
sickness fund argued that cost containment was the principal motivation
for the termination or downward adjustment of the contracts with a
number of physiotherapists. According to the sickness fund, the prevail-
ing oversupply of physiotherapists in the region had resulted in excessive
expenditures on physiotherapy (the per capita cost being 20 percent
above the national average). In this case, the Court considered that it
would not be reasonable to order the sickness fund to resume contractual
negotiations, particularly since the physiotherapists explicitly rejected
the legitimacy of the insurer's cost containment objectives.
In another important case, which was brought before the Court of
Appeal of 's Hertogenbosch, the court ruled that a sickness fund lawfully
denied a contract to a new pharmacist.47 According to the court, since
1992 a sickness fund has been free to contract with any pharmacist,
provided that it furnishes continuous and good quality care to its subscrib-
ers, and takes into account the length of the contractual relationship with
a provider. In this case the sickness fund justified its decision not to
contract with a new pharmacist on the basis that it needed to preserve an
efficient number and location of financially viable pharmacies. Accord-
ing to the Court, this argument was plausible.
45. Supra note 27.
46. Regional Court of Almelo, Sentence 2 August 1996, Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht,
no. 97/17.
47. Court of Appeal 's Hertogenbosch, Sentence May 14, 1996, RZA, no. 96/17.
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3. Conclusion: The Courts' Stance on Rights and Cost Containment
In general Dutch courts attach a high degree of importance to the
principles of medical necessity, urgency, and freedom of choice. Never-
theless, the cases we have analyzed demonstrate that the courts do not
interpret the right to health care as guaranteed access to all services that
are medically and technically possible, but accepts that rights to health
care can be conditioned by cost considerations. Attempts by payers and
governments to restrict entitlement to care with reference to resource
scarcity do not encounter an unambiguously hostile reaction from the
legal environment.
VIII. Lessons for Canada?
Both Canada and the Netherlands are searching for acceptable models of
health reform combining universal access with cost containment and
improvements in efficiency. Moreover, in addition to a strong societal
commitment to universality (or, what is referred to in the Netherlands as
the solidarity principle), the health care systems in both countries have
important features in common, such as a mixed system of predominantly
public insurance and private providers, the "gatekeeper" role of general
practitioners, a system of global budgeting for hospitals' operating costs,
and an institutionalized process of collective fee negotiations.
Despite these important similarities there are also a number of notable
differences. First, Dutch provinces are far less autonomous than the
Canadian ones, implying that Dutch health policy is primarily deter-
mined at the national level. Hence, in the Netherlands the health care
system is relatively homogeneous as compared to Canada. However, if
the trend toward a greater European integration continues, the Nether-
lands may gradually become a "province" of the European Union and
might eventually need a European counterpart of the five principles
(public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability and
accessibility) of the Canada Health Act. The two most important criteria
will be universality and portability.
A second meaningful difference between both countries' health care
systems is that the Canadian public insurance system is based on a
"single-payer" model, whereas the Dutch health insurance system is
based on a "multi-payer" model. However, the Dutch system is partly
moving in the Canadian direction because in 1998 the national health
insurance for long-term care and mental health care (AWBZ) will be
transformed from a multi-payer into a single-payer system.
With regard to basic acute care, by contrast, Dutch health care reform
is directed at reinforcing its multi-payer constitution by transforming the
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sickness funds from monopolistic regional administrative bodies into
competitive managed care insurers. Since the presence of multiple payers
is an essential ingredient of the Dutch managed competition reform, one
may wonder what lessons can be applied to Canada. This is particularly
so since Canadians seem to be very attached to the single-payer model.48
In a comparative study of health care reform in seventeen member
countries, the OECD even concluded that "the Canadian approach to
health care reform acknowledges the limited effectiveness of market
forces in health and eschews policies such as managed competition and
the creation of internal markets. Rather, Canada is addressing the need for
cost-containment by using the monopsonistic (sic) control afforded to
provincial governments as principal payers of health care and by focusing
on quality assurance."'4 9
Of course, one may question the rationale behind the staunch adher-
ence to the single-payer model. The main argument in favour of a single-
payer system seems to be the potential saving of transaction costs which
are inherent to a multi-payer contract system. But these potential savings
can be captured only by sacrificing incentives for the payer to compel
providers to be efficient and innovative and to be responsive to consum-
ers' preferences. Moreover, as argued by Blomqvist, "many provincial
systems are too big, and local conditions within the provinces too diverse,
for effective centralized management. '50 Besides, Canada has been
gradually transforming from a classical public insurance scheme toward
a public service system, since presently approximately 75 percent of
health care expenditures are tax funded and only Alberta and British
Columbia still charge premiums to provincial residents. As a conse-
quence, the provincial health plans became increasingly susceptible to
contamination by political considerations. 51 Finally, the Canadian Bar
Association noticed that, given the ability of provincial governments to
determine what services are insured and to change the list of insured
48. For instance, in 1997 the National Forum on Health recommended preserving and
protecting the "single payer" model as being one of the four key features of the Canadian health
care system. See National Forum on Health, Canada Health Action: Building on the Legacy
(Ottawa: National Forum on Health, 1997).
49. OECD,supra note 12 at 103.
50. A. Blomqvist, "Conclusion: Themes in Health Care Reform" in A. Blomqvist & D.M.
Brown, eds., Limits to Care: Reforming Canada's Health System in an Age of Restraint
(Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994) at 411.
51. Blomqvist, ibid. at 411 ,asserts that "abundant anecdotal evidence exists of cases in which
local political influence has been used to allow institutions to continue operating long after
efficiency considerations would have caused them to close, or where it has led to certain
communities receiving a disproportionate share of aggregate health resources."
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services without any warning to beneficiaries, the provincial health
insurance plan lacks the certainty of private health insurance coverage.
5 2
The understanding that provincial health plans may be too big has led
to growing support for some form of decentralized planning and fund-
ing. 3 In particular,the principle of population-based funding for local or
regional bodies is receiving a great deal of attention.54 Under this
principle, decisions about resource allocation are delegated to local and
regional bodies (such as a District Health Council in Ontario) which
receive prospective capitation payments from the province. According to
Blomqvist,the predetermined budget may be adjusted for the population's
age structure and, perhaps, population density.5 Once such a system is
in place, however, one would only have to remove the regional barriers
to introduce competition among the different funding agencies. Of
course, as the Dutch experience demonstrates, the introduction of effec-
tive managed competition requires a lot more than that. Perhaps most
crucial to the success of the managed competition model is the develop-
ment of an adequate mechanism of risk-adjustment to prevent risk
selection by health insurers.
6
A second argument that is often advanced in favour of a single-payer
model is that risk selection would not be a problem. This argument,
however, only holds true if there is no competition on the supply side. As
a matter of fact, any combination of capitation payments and competition,
whether among providers, among payers or among both, eventually
requires a sophisticated risk-adjustment method to counteract risk selec-
tion or price discrimination." For instance, if, as proposed by Blomqvist,
Canadian regional funding agencies are allowed to enter into capitation
contracts with primary providers, a case-mix adjusted capitation fee will
be necessary to counteract incentives for physicians to enroll only those
patients with low service demands.
52. The Canadian Bar Association, What's Law Got To Do With It? Health Care Reform in
Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1994).
53. For an extensive discussion of the movement toward local and regional health planning
in two major provinces, see J.D. Blum, "Universality, Quality & Economics: Finding a Balance
in Ontario and British Columbia" (1994) 20 Am. J. Law & Med. 203.
54. Blomqvist, supra note 50 at 411-12.
55. Blomqvist, ibid. at 412.
56. W.P.M.M. van de Ven & R.CJ.A. van Vliet, "How Can We Prevent Cream Skimming
in a Competitive Health Insurance Market? The Great Challenge for the 90s" in P. Zweifel &
H.E. Frech, eds., Health Economics Worldwide (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1992) at 23-46.
57. M. Matsaganis & H. Glennerster, "The Threat of 'Cream Skimming' in the Post-Reform
NHS" (1994) 13 J. Health Econ. 31.
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An important lesson from the Dutch health care reform for Canada
might be that, although the logic of the managed competition model is
appealing, its implementation is quite complicated and requires a strong
government to set and enforce the rules of competition. Moreover, it
requires a prolonged political commitment and a sufficient economic
growth to alleviate the permanent pressure on the government to concen-
trate on short-term cost containment measures rather than on a long-term
reform strategy. If these preconditions are not met, the prospects of a
successful introduction of managed competition are bleak. Furthermore,
what is often insufficiently understood by health policy-makers is that
even successful introduction of managed competition does not guarantee
the attainment of macro-economic cost containment targets. Cost con-
tainment at the macro level and improvement of efficiency at the micro
level are not just two sides of the same coin. This is because managed
competition may not only lead to lower production costs but also to higher
productivity (e.g. a reduction of waiting lists) and a higher responsiveness
to consumer preferences or patient needs.
Another lesson from the Dutch reform experience might be that other
strategies to reduce costs while preserving equity are also difficult. For
example, the application of the criteria of the Dunning Commission to
distinguish among "basic" and "nonbasic" health care services proved in
practice not to be viable. For many medical procedures the clinical
evidence required to operationalize the criteria of necessity and effective-
ness turns out to be too thin. Furthermore, cost-effectiveness studies are
often not available for applying the efficiency criterion. Finally, the
difficulty experienced by high-risk individuals in obtaining affordable
supplementary insurance coverage for dental protheses demonstrates that
even the relatively straightforward criterion of whether a service is
individually affordable is not easy to apply in practice.
These observations may be particularly relevant with regard to the
second principle of the Canada Health Act - comprehensiveness - which
requires that provincial plans cover all medically necessary services. 8
Although health care is not explicitly enumerated in the Canadian
Constitution as a provincial power, it is, nevertheless, a provincial
responsibility. 9 Federal jurisdiction over health care is focused on the
58. According to the Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, s. 9, comprehensiveness
requires that provincial health insurance plans cover "all insured health services provided by
hospitals, medical practitioners or dentists, and where the law of the province so permits,
similar or additional services rendered by other health care practitioners."
59. R. v. Schneider, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112.
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criminal law power, the spending power and the power with respect to
peace, order and good government. The spending power is not set out
explicitly in the Constitution but is, even more than in the Netherlands,
a matter of constitutional interpretation.
A more liberal approach to the spending power has been recognized
judicially in Canada and is articulated in section 36 of the Constitution
Act since 1982, which states that all governments should provide
"reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably compa-
rable levels of taxation."' Moreover, during the last decade the steadily
diminishing cash contributions from the federal government to the
provinces have weakened the federal spending power to enforce the
principles of the Canada Health Act, such as comprehensiveness.
6
Like Canada, the Netherlands has a written constitution. But unlike
Canada, the Netherlands has detailed entitlement directives and regula-
tions which describe the health services guaranteed and the providers
authorized to deliver services. The Canada Health Act defines insured
health services as hospital services, physician services and surgical-
dental services. Provinces are able to determine what services fall within
the ambit of medically required and are therefore "insured health ser-
vices" giving rise to reimbursement.62
A key problem is that provinces have failed to define or set out the
criteria by which medically necessary or required care is to be estab-
60. The Canadian Bar Association,supra note 52 at 16. Other sources of a constitutional right
to health care may be found in sections 7 and 15, supported by section 36. Section 7 states that
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice". It can be claimed that
section 7 guarantees a constitutional right to health care, but in practical terms a right to life and
security is meaningless without access to health care, both in a preventive and treatment sense
(D. Longley, Health Care Constitutions (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1996) at 24). This
argument has also been endorsed by the Law Reform Commission in Canada which suggested
that the right to security of the person means not only the protection of physical integrity but
also the provision of what is necessary to support it (M. Jackman, "The Regulation of Private
Health Care in Canada under the Canada Health Act and the Canadian Charter" (1994)
6Constitutional Forum at 54). Section 15 (1) states: "Every individual is equal before and
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability...". However according to the
Canadian Bar Association, supra note 52 at 26, there is no right to health care under the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms in the Canadian Constitution. Notwithstanding that, there is a general
expectation among the Canadian public that there is a right to health care.
61. According to the Canadian Bar Association, supra note 52 at 13, the percentage of federal
contribution to total health spending fell from approximately 33 percent in 1977 to 23.5 percent
in 1993.
62. Longley, supra note 60 at 25.
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lished. As noted by Evans, the concept of "medical necessity" might
receive further consideration in the future if provincial governments
decided simply to "de-insure" services with no demonstrable health
benefit.63 On the other hand, the National Forum on Health recommended
a further expansion of publicly funded services "to include all medically
necessary services, and in the first instance, home care and drugs."'
In the Netherlands patients are entitled to care defined in acts and
regulations but the criterion of medical necessity was circumscribed by
court rulings. Since the 1980s the entitlement to health care has increas-
ingly come under tight central control and new benefits have to pass a
complex procedure with the Ministry making the final decisions. As in
Canada, current legal doctrine distinguishes between individual (nega-
tive) and social (positive) rights in the sphere of health. According to the
Canadian Bar Association, with the exception of Quebec there is no
legislative text which defines the right to health care in any other
Canadian jurisdiction.65 The Association recommends that "to define a
right to health care, each province and territory should...express a
commitment to the principles..., set out criteria to be used.... establish an
open process of consultation with all health care providers, consumer
representatives and others for defining the right to health care".66
The right to health care in the Netherlands has a substantial legal
content. Although the constitutional basis of this right is weak, social and
health legislation have translated it into an enforceable right to equal
access and freedom of choice. Therefore, conflicts result from attempts
to restrict entitlement. One of the results of the new contracting system
in Dutch social health insurance is that more patients are going to court
to assert their rights to benefits which the health insurers have not
contracted for or for which the amount contracted is insufficient. Dutch
courts attach much importance to the principles of medical necessity,
urgency and freedom of choice. However, as is apparent from a number
of cases, the courts do not interpret the right to health care as guaranteeing
access to all services that are medically and technically possible but
accept curtailment of entitlement with reference to resource scarcity. The
observation that the courts may fulfill a crucial role in delineating
necessary care could be important for Canada given that the determina-
tion of what actually constitutes insured health services has been, and will
63. Evans, supra note 3 at 372.
64. National Forum on Health, supra note 48 at 20.
65. Canadian Bar Association, supra note 52 at 42.
66. Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 43.
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likely continue to be, a matter of controversy between the federal and
provincial governments. When the Canadian provinces move toward
decentralized funding, managed care or, perhaps, to some form of
managed competition, the need for an adequate definition of entitlement
to health care will become even more pronounced.
